The “sweetheart defense” is a recurring argument in Philippine rape prosecutions, where the accused claims that a romantic relationship existed with the complainant, thereby implying that the sexual act was consensual. This defense is often invoked to negate the element of force, threat, or intimidation required for a conviction of rape.
I. Jurisprudential Treatment
A. General Principles
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the sweetheart defense, to be credible, must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence of a romantic relationship and, crucially, of the victim’s consent to the sexual act. Mere allegations or self-serving statements are insufficient.
“To pass muster, this Court, in People v. Olesco, requires that the defense must prove with compelling evidence the following elements: first, that the accused and the victim were lovers; and second, that she consented to the alleged sexual relations. As indicia of the purported relationship between the accused and the victim, evidence such as letters, documents, photographs, ‘or any concrete proof of a romantic nature’ must be proffered.”
— Toraldeyhernandez v. People of the Philippines (2025)
Even if a romantic relationship is established, it does not automatically negate the crime of rape. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized:
“Love is not a license for carnal intercourse through force or intimidation. Even granting that appellant and complainant were really sweethearts, that fact alone would not negate the commission of rape. A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will.”
— Toraldeyhernandez v. People of the Philippines (2025)
II. Special Rule for Minors
For victims below the statutory age or those exploited in prostitution or sexual abuse, the sweetheart defense is categorically unavailing. As held in People v. Udang, Sr. (2018):
“For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person. The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse. Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.”
— People v. Udang, Sr. (2018)